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ROBERT J. CURRIE*

ABDUCTED FUGITIVES BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

In the law and literature relating to the exertion of criminal jurisdiction over the person,1 there exists a nagging problem that has
plagued practitioners, courts and academics alike. The phrase of art is
usually something along the lines of ‘‘irregular rendition’’, but the
issues are as notorious as they are controversial: what should a court
do with an accused criminal brought before it as a result of abduction
(or otherwise illegal detention) from a foreign state? And, in particular, should the fact of the illegal or irregular rendition of the fugitive
affect either the court’s ability or its willingness to take jurisdiction
over the case?
Irregular rendition is a somewhat unusual circumstance, but the relatively small number of reported domestic and international decisions
that deal with the issue stands in sharp contrast to the large amount of

* Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
Canada-U.K. Perspectives on Public International Law Conference, hosted by the Legal Studies Group of the British Association for
Canadian Studies at London, U.K., June 24, 2005. Thanks are due to Hugh Kindred, Bill Gilmore, Ken Gallant, James Sloan,
Joseph Rikof and Bill Fenrick for their comments.
1 Or "enforcement jurisdiction," as opposed to the ability of the state to exert criminal jurisdiction over the crime or subject matter,
often called the prescriptive jurisdiction." The classic exposition is that of Professor Akehurst; see Michael Akehurst,
"Jurisdiction in International Law" (1972-1973) 46 BRIT. YR. INT'L. L. 145.
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scholarly ink that has been spilled,2 most usually in reaction to contentious superior court decisions such as that of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Alvarez-Machain.3 The issue is something of a ‘‘motherhood’’ matter for
courts, as it goes to the very legality of the criminal trial of an individual
and highlights the separation of function between judiciary and executive,
enabling the former to call the latter to account for unlawful conduct in
criminal law enforcement. Yet beyond this, the issue has all the irresistible
appeal of the most Gordian of legal problems. It presents a sharp dilemma
regarding means and ends in bringing criminals to justice. It also engages
international law issues, from state sovereignty to international human
rights norms to international peace and security, and sharply
juxtaposes them with the requirements of domestic adjudication processes. As a result, much has been said and even more has been written.4
Why, then, would one wish to revisit every international law student’s favourite essay topic? The time seems to be ripe for two reasons.

2

A partial list only: Edwin D. Dickinson, ‘‘Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest
in Violation of International Law’’ (1934) 28 AM. J. INT’L L. 231; F. Morgenstern,
‘‘Jurisdiction in Seizures Effect in Violation of International Law’’ (1952) 29 BRIT. YB.
INT’L L. 265; Paul O’Higgins, ‘‘Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition’’ (1960) 36
BRIT. YB. INT’L L. 279; I.A. Shearer, ‘‘International Kidnapping’’ (1971) 5 INT’L L. REV.
27; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘‘Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as
Alternatives to Extradition’’ (1973) 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 25; F.A. Mann,
‘‘Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law,’’
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE (Yoram Dinstein, ed., 1989), pp. 407–421; A. Lowenfeld, ‘‘US Law Enforcement
Abroad: The Constitution and International Law’’ (1989) 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 880 (plus
follow-up articles at (1990) 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 444, (1990) 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 712 and
(1991) 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 655); Hermann Woltring and Joanne Grieg, ‘‘State-Sponsored
Kidnapping of Fugitives: An Alternative to Extradition?’’ in THE ALLEGED TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL (Richard Atkins, ed., 1995), pp. 115–126; GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998), Chapter 7;
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE,
4th ed. (2002) (hereafter ‘‘Bassiouni, International Extradition’’), Chapter V.
3
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
4
For recent efforts, see Francesco de Sanctis, ‘‘The Practice of National and International Courts on Transnational Seizure: Is A Fair Balance Between Human Rights and
Accountability Possible?’’ (2004) 22 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 529, and Jeffrey Loan, ‘‘Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain: Extraterritorial Abduction and the Rights of Individuals Under
International Law’’ (2005) 12 ILSA J. INT’L COMP. L. 253. See also Abraham Mohit,
‘‘The Customary Law of International Abductions: Limits and Boundaries’’ (2006) 11
ASIAN YB. INT’L L. 123. On the related issue of extraordinary rendition, see Margaret L.
Satterthwaite, ‘‘Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of law’’
(November 20, 2006). New York University School of Law. New York University Public Law
and Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper 43. http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/4
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First, while the matter was traditionally a domestic law one that had
some international law features, it has recently become fully ‘‘internationalized’’ through commentary and decisions at the international
or supra-national level. Human rights adjudicatory bodies have had
cause to rule on these types of problems,5 and most recently the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights rendered its decision in the case of Öcalan v. Turkey.6 Most prominently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia7 has dealt with the
jurisdictional problems attaching to illegal arrest in a ‘‘trans-border’’
setting in a series of cases, culminating in the 2003 decision of the
Appeals Chamber in the case of Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´.8
The ICTY’s decisions are perhaps the most interesting, both because
the Tribunal’s mandate means that its indictees are those charged with the
most heinous of international crimes, and because these are the first cases
where a truly ‘‘international’’ criminal court has had to deal with the issue
of its own jurisdiction over abducted fugitives. This leads to the second
reason the topic remains worthy of attention: the fact that the International Criminal Court9 is now fully functional and investigating its first set
of cases, wherein arrest warrants have been issued and one arrest made.10

5

See Section II(2.1), below.
Öcalan v. Turkey, Appl. No. 00046221/99, Merits, Judgment of 12 May 2005
(hereafter ‘‘Öcalan’’).
7
Hereafter the ‘‘ICTY’’ or ‘‘the Tribunal.’’
8
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest, Appeals Chamber, 5 June 2003
(hereafter ‘‘Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber)’’).
9
Hereafter the ‘‘ICC’’ or the ‘‘Court.’’ It was established by the 1998 Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) as corr. by
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/INF/3, (1998) 37 I.L.M. 999 (hereafter ‘‘Rome Statute’’).
10
On 2 May 2007, the Court issued arrest warrants for Ahmad Harun, current
Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan, and Ali Kushayb, leader of the
Janjaweed Militia, in connection with events in Darfur, Sudan (Press Release: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/241.html). Earlier, arrest warrants were issued for
five members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in the case regarding Uganda, and on 17
March 2006 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, sought by the ICC in the case regarding the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, was surrendered to the Court. See generally Seventh
Diplomatic Briefing of the International Criminal Court, 29 June 2006, available online at:
< http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/DB7-St_English.pdf>. See also William Schabas, ‘‘First Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court’’ (2006) 27 HUMAN RIGHTS
L. J. 25; Annalisa Ciampi, ‘‘Current and Future Scenarios for Arrest and Surrender to
the ICC’’ (2006) 66 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 719.
6
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Past experience tells us that the Court will most likely be faced with this
issue, and indeed, as will be argued below, its unique characteristics
make this possibility nearly inevitable. Accordingly, it may be beneficial to do some stock-taking as to the state of the law regarding abducted or illegally obtained fugitives, and make an inquiry as to how
this problem may and should play out before the ICC.
Section I of this article will briefly sketch out the major trends in
the domestic caselaw and state practice on this issue. Section II will
review the jurisprudence of international courts, focussing on the
caselaw of the ICTY and in particular on the Appeals Chamber’s
decision in Nikolic´. Section III will evaluate the potential fate of
abducted fugitives before the ICC, in light of the significant structural
differences between that body and courts which have gone before.
Given the likely precedential impact of the test in Nikolic´, the
potential and propriety of the ICC applying that test will be explored,
with suggestions and criticism where appropriate.
I

DOMESTIC CASELAW: A MIXED BAG

Criminal defendants raising illegal rendition as a bar to court proceedings is not at all new, and cases can be traced back to the 19th
century.11 In modern times, two approaches have competed for
dominance in state practice, which bear brief outlining.12
For present purposes, the logical starting point is what is probably, even in the present day, the most well-known of the abduction
cases: Israel v. Eichmann.13 In that case, the accused had led the
Jewish Office of the German Gestapo during World War II and was

11

E.g. Lawler, cited in LORD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS: SELECTED
ANNOTATED (1956), Vol. I, at 78; Ker v. Illinois, 119 US 436 (1886) (Sup. Ct.).
I would note that I am retreading extremely familiar and well-known ground on
this point. For an excellent brief summary of similar scope to the present one, see
James Sloan, ‘‘Prosecutor v. Todorovic´: Illegal Capture as an Obstacle to the Exercise
of International Criminal Jurisdiction’’ (2003) 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 85, at 99–101.
See also Susan Lamb, ‘‘The Powers of Arrest of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia’’ (1999) 70 BRIT. YB. INT’L L. 167, p. 228 ff.
13
The Attorney–General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann (1968) 36 ILR 18
(Dist. Ct., 1961) (hereafter ‘‘Eichmann (Dist. Ct.)’’) and (1968) 36 ILR 277 (Sup. Ct.,
1962). See generally L.C. Green, ‘‘The Eichmann Case’’ (1960) 23 MOD. L. REV. 507;
J.E.S. Fawcett, ‘‘The Eichmann Case’’ (1962) 38 BRIT. YB. INT’L L. 181.
AND
12
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one of the primary authors of the ‘‘final solution.’’ He was abducted
from his home in Argentina by Israeli agents14 and taken to Israel,
where he was tried for his crimes, convicted and ultimately hanged.
The abduction itself provoked an international dispute between Israel
and Argentina, the latter protesting what it viewed as a violation of
its sovereignty—a view with which the United Nations Security
Council concurred.15 The two governments eventually issued a joint
declaration wherein Israel appeared to acknowledge the illegality of
the abduction at international law, and both declared that they
viewed the matter as closed.16
At trial before the District Court and in his appeal to the Supreme
Court, Eichmann argued, inter alia, that the illegality of his apprehension—at international law—deprived the Israeli courts of jurisdiction over him. The District Court surveyed state practice on the
issue and found that, as ‘‘an established rule of law’’17 it was not open
to a criminal accused to challenge the legality of the criminal proceedings on the basis of how he was brought within the jurisdiction of
the state. This rule, usually expressed in the maxim mala captus bene
detentus, essentially entails that because the ‘‘illegality’’ involved in
the accused’s rendition arises from an international delict, the
domestic court ‘‘will assert in personam jurisdiction without inquiring
into the means by which the presence of the defendant was
secured’’.18 The Supreme Court concurred with the District Court’s
findings, and Eichmann’s argument failed.
Eichmann is an effective starting point because it lays out clearly
some of the basic legal issues at play. First, it seems reasonably clear
that abductions of this sort do indeed constitute violations of state
sovereignty,19 since it is well-established that a state may not exercise
14

There was initially some controversy about this, as at one point Israeli Prime
Minister David Ben Gurion claimed to have been the author of the operation but
later stated it was the work of private individuals (Green, ibid., pp. 514–15).
15
See the Security Council’s Resolution on the subject, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960),
S/RES/138, 1960, in particular para. 2.
16
Quoted in Eichmann (Dist. Ct.), supra note 13, p. 59.
17
Ibid.
18
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 2, p. 250.
19
This has been settled since even before the famous 1935 Harvard Research
Document, which made note of it: Harvard Research in International Law, ‘‘Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime’’ (1935) 29 AJIL Special Supplement Part II 435, pp. 623–624. For a short but effective demonstration of the
point, see M. Scharf, ‘‘The Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic´: Irregular Rendition
and the ICTY’’ (1998) 11 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 369, pp. 372–373.
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police or criminal enforcement powers on the territory of another
state without the latter’s permission.20 It is just as clear, however, that
this violation of one state’s rights by another does not, in and of
itself, provide the individual concerned with standing to request a
remedy for the violation; he/she is truly, in this sense, the traditional
object of the law, rather than its subject. The international law violation must be cognizable and justiciable by the domestic criminal
court, on the basis of the domestic law.
By what route, then, can such justiciability arise? From the individual’s perspective, abduction or illegal rendition will tend to violate
international human rights norms, particularly those dealing with due
process and security of person.21 Redress for these violations at the
international law level can be sought before the supervisory bodies
under the relevant treaty regimes, such as the U.N. Human Rights
Committee, if the individual has the means to do so. To the extent
that these norms are incorporated into the domestic human rights
regime (if any), it is conceivable that the accused may obtain a
remedy by that route. Yet this will only appertain, if it does at all,
where the domestic state’s enforcement authorities were directly involved in the abduction. Moreover, it does not answer the question of

20

R. HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT,
p. 70 (1994); JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE, p.
173 (2000). An interesting point which one does not see covered in the literature is
this: beyond the international illegality of trans-border abductions, abduction is
clearly illegal in any setting, whether perpetrated by state or private actors. It is an
offence known to virtually every criminal law system in the world, to the point where
it is likely a ‘‘general principle of law’’ for the purposes of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ
Statute. Since state police cannot legally operate outside their own borders, even a
trans-border ‘‘arrest’’ is ultimately simply a common abduction. As Mann has argued cogently, even if the abduction is performed by private actors, the receiving
state offends sovereignty by ‘‘ratifying’’ this illegal action (Mann, supra note 2, p.
408). At the very least, this may speak to why abduction and illegal rendition taint, in
some sense, every proceeding in which they occur.
21
E.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171
(‘‘ICCPR’’), article 9; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 213 UNTS 221 (‘‘ECHR’’), article 5; American
Convention on Human Rights (1969) OASTS 36 (‘‘ACHR’’), article 7. See HIGGINS,
ibid.; Mann, supra note 2, p. 470. It is perhaps worth noting that in its assessment of
the Alvarez-Machain case, discussed below, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention stated that ‘‘[the] detention of Humberto Alvarez-Machain is declared to
be arbitrary, being in contravention of … Article 9 of the [ICCPR]’’ (Report of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Commission on Human Rights, 50th
Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27 (1993), at 139–40).
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how, and whether, the international law violation itself affects the
domestic process.
The mala captus bene detentus rule, of course, dictates that the
domestic judicial forum should not entertain issues related to the
legality of capture. The most prominent modern application of
the rule was by the U.S. Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain.22 In that
case, the Mexican accused was abducted from his office in Mexico by
agents retained by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and
taken to Texas where he was arrested by DEA personnel. His motion
to dismiss the indictment on the basis of his abduction was granted by
the lower courts, both of which emphasized that the Executive had
violated the existing extradition treaty between the U.S. and Mexico
by simply ignoring it, as well as Mexico’s formal protests of the
abduction at the international level. The Supreme Court, however,
applied the mala captus bene detentus rule23 and, while it acknowledged that the government’s actions were likely in violation of
international law, ruled that forcible extra-territorial abduction did
not prohibit the criminal trial of Alvarez-Machain.24
The mala captus bene detentus rule, then, enjoys a certain amount
of currency in state practice.25 It seems appropriate to note, however,
22

Supra, note 3. Space literally does not permit even partial citation of the literature pertaining to this highly controversial decision; but see Reisman, ‘‘Covert
Action’’ (1995) 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 419; Paul Michell, ‘‘English-Speaking Justice:
Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible Abduction After Alvarez-Machain
(1996) 29 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 383; C. Biblowit, ‘‘Transborder Abductions and
United States Policy: Comments on United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1996) 9 N.Y.
INT’L L. Rev. 105; CHRISTOPHER PYLE, EXTRADITION, POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
pp. 281–299 (2001).
23
Known in U.S. jurisprudence as the ‘‘Ker-Frisbie Doctrine’’ after the foundational cases on point.
24
The charges against Dr. Alvarez-Machain were later dismissed for lack of evidence, the court noting that the indictment was based on ‘‘the wildest speculation’’
(Seth Mydans, ‘‘Judge Clears Mexican in Agent’s Killing,’’ New York Times, Dec.
15, 1992, p. A20). His civil action against his abductors and the U.S. government was
also dismissed by the Supreme Court (Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. (Docket
No. 03–339, June 29, 2004)).
25
Given the current climate in the U.S. with regard to the ‘‘war on terror,’’ any
changes in the law in this regard seem unlikely. For a recent and succinct overview of
the US position on the issue, see Matthew Slater, ‘‘Trumpeting Justice: The Implications of U.S. Law and Policy for the International Rendition of Terrorists from
Failed or Uncooperative States’’ (2004) 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 151, pp.
168–186. See also David P. Warner, ‘‘Challenges to International Law Enforcement
Cooperation for the United States in the Middle East and North Africa: Extradition
and its Alternatives’’ (2005) 50 VILL. L. REV. 479, pp. 500–503.
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as Professor Bassiouni has, that those who wish to utilize Roman
maxims would do well to pay attention to others which historically
took precedence. The first of these is nunquam decurritur ad extraordinarium sed ubi deficit ordinarium (never resort to the extraordinary until the ordinary fails).26 Frustration with the ineffectiveness of
ordinary channels of obtaining personal jurisdiction, such as extradition, is often pleaded as a justification for abduction.27 It is noteworthy, however, that in both Eichmann and Alvarez-Machain,
arguably the two most prominent abduction cases in legal history, no
serious attempt was made to obtain the ‘‘fugitive’’ by way of ordinary
means. Clearly abduction will often be used as an abusive method of
enforcing domestic or foreign policy, particularly by those states with
the power and resources to do so.
The second relevant maxim is this: ex injuria ius non oritur
(‘‘certain violations of law [should] not ripen into lawful
results’’).28 It is this principle which underpins the other important
trend in state practice on this issue, which has been termed ‘‘male
captus male detentus,’’29 but is perhaps best described as a specific
application of the doctrine of abuse of process. The central idea is
that a court has an inherent duty to protect the dignity, legitimacy
and legality of its process, which would be subverted in any case
where a criminal accused has been apprehended through illegal
activities or abuses of power on the part of the state. The state
‘‘must come to court Ôwith clean hands’ as it were.’’30 Participation
by state agents in violations of international law, by this view,
must be seen as tainting the process to the point where a court

26

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 2 p. 286.
See, e.g., Michael H. Cardozo, ‘‘When Extradition Fails, is Abduction the
Solution?’’ (1961) 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 127.
28
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 2 p. 287; Mann, supra note
2, p. 414. Professor Higgins has queried whether this represents too expansive an
application of this principle; see HIGGINS, supra note 20, p. 72; Lamb, supra note 12,
pp. 228–230.
29
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defence Motion
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, 9 October 2002 (hereafter
‘‘Nikolic´ (Trial Chamber)’’), para. 70, quoting a Defence motion.
30
State v. Ebrahim, 1991 (2) SA 553, in translation at 95 ILR 417, at 442 (ILR).
27

ABDUCTED FUGITIVES

&

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

357

should, in sufficiently egregious circumstances, decline to exercise
jurisdiction over the individual.31
The most prominent example of this approach is probably that of
the House of Lords in Ex Parte Bennett.32 Bennett, a New Zealand
national, was sought by British authorities for alleged offences.
Discovering he was in South Africa, the British authorities arranged
with police in that country for Bennett to be abducted—or at least
irregularly deported33—and unofficially delivered into their hands. As
the House of Lords noted disapprovingly, this procedure was carried
out despite, and in complete disregard for, the existing extradition
procedures between the U.K. and South Africa.34
The Law Lords concluded that by way of the abuse of process
doctrine, courts may inquire into the manner in which an accused was
brought before them and may stay the prosecution if the circumstances warrant. In this case, the authorities’ deliberate flouting of the
extradition arrangements, inter alia, rendered such a remedy appropriate. It seems clear, however, that it was not the subverting of

31

As Professor Sloan has noted, the specific rationalia for applying this principle
that have been put forth by domestic courts include: (i) the rule of law; (ii) the
integrity of the executive branch (it must not be rewarded for illegal behaviour); (iii)
the integrity of the judicial branch; (iv) the fairness of the legal process; and (v)
respect for state sovereignty (James Sloan, ‘‘Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´: Decision
on Defence Motion on Illegal Capture’’ (2003) 16 Leiden J. Int’l L. 541, pp. 546–47,
footnotes omitted).
32
R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Bennett, [1994] 1 A.C. 42.
See V. Lowe, ‘‘Circumventing Extradition Procedures is an Abuse of Process’’ (1993)
52 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 371. See also R. v. Hartley, [1978] 2 NZLR 199, 77 ILR 330
(NZCA); State v. Ebrahim, supra note 30; State v. Beahan, 1992(1) SACR 307 (A)
(Zimbabwe).
33
I.e. the not unusual practice of ‘‘disguised extradition,’’ a multi-layered term
which will be used here in a general way to cover situations where there is some kind
of legal irregularity employed by state officials to remove a fugitive from one jurisdiction to another. A typical example is the use of deportation from one state which
is undertaken, not to exclude the individual from the deporting state, but to put him
in the hands of the authorities of another state. This would include the practice
Professor Bassiouni defines as ‘‘unlawful seizure’’; BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION, supra note 2, pp. 258–261. See generally GILBERT, supra note 2, pp.
362–377.
34
Ex parte Bennett, supra note 32, pp. 62–64.
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extradition procedures itself that was so offensive to the court;35
rather, the matter was one of respect for the rule of law in the global
sense:
When it is shown that the law enforcement agency responsible for bringing a prosecution has only been enabled to do so by participation in violations of international
law and the laws of another state in order to secure the presence of the accused …, I
think that respect for the rule of law demands that the court take cognisance of that
circumstance.36

In this manner, the abuse of process doctrine addresses the international law violations involved in abduction and illegal rendition, but in
terms that ‘‘domesticize’’ them into a framework where the national
court is comfortable passing judgment.37 With regard to this specific
issue, this approach shares some roots with mala captus bene detentus,
in that courts are not automatically deprived of jurisdiction by way of
illegal rendition38; the inquiry, rather, is whether a court should exercise
jurisdiction.39 The ultimate sanction, dismissal, is a function of the
court’s ability to control its own process from abuse by the state. This is
also observable in another prominent decision, that of the U.S. 2nd

35

As Professor Sloan points out, the Prosecutor made an argument attempting to
narrow this approach to extradition in the Todorovic´ case, discussed below, but it is
largely unconvincing (Sloan, ‘‘Prosecutor v. Todorovic´,’’ supra note 12, pp. 102–103).
Certainly in a subsequent case, R. v. Mullen, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 777, the U.K. Criminal
Court of Appeals went beyond subversion of extradition as a basis for declining
jurisdiction.
36
Ex parte Bennett, supra note 32, p. 67, per Lord Bridge of Harwich. Bennett
ultimately faced trial in Scotland on different charges, where a full inquiry into the
facts of his return from South Africa determined that the police conduct had not
been sufficiently ‘‘abusive’’ to warrant declining of jurisdiction; Bennett v. H.M.
Advocate 1995 S.L.T. 510. For a summary in the context of an excellent review of this
use of abuse of process by British courts, see Colin Warbrick, ‘‘Judicial Jurisdiction
and Abuse of Process’’ (2000) 49 INT’L. COMP. L. Q. 489.
37
Indeed, it is something of a simplification to simply use ‘‘abuse of process’’ as a
general descriptive term; as Lamb notes, the relevant criteria for courts which have
applied this principle involve a mix of domestic and international legal issues, some
of which she describes as ‘‘arrests effected in violation of extradition procedures,’’
‘‘official complicity in the unlawful conduct leading to the presence of the accused
before the court,’’ and ‘‘egregious conduct on the part of law enforcement authorities
amounting to an abuse of the court’s process’’ (Lamb, supra note 12, pp. 232–37).
38
Though the stricter approach was adopted in Ebrahim; supra note 30.
39
Accord, Mann, supra note 2, p. 414.
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Toscanino,40 where that court was willing to
decline jurisdiction on the basis of egregious, physical human rights
abuses perpetrated upon the fugitive which were brought about via
irregular trans-border conduct by U.S. authorities.41
The tension between these two approaches, mala captus bene detentus on the one hand and abuse of process on the other, remains
current from a state practice point of view. Given this tension, neither
approach could be seriously suggested to have attained any status as
a rule of customary international law.42 While it has been expressed,
even recently, in learned quarters that mala captus bene detentus may
be viewed as having significant normative force,43 a combination of
contrary national decisions, a general rise in the prominence of
human rights, and the harsh criticism of the Alvarez-Machain case
would seem to have undermined this.44 As will be seen, however, as
40

United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (Ct. App. 2nd Circ., 1974), p. 274.
In American law, Toscanino operates as more of an exception to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine; see S. Wilske and T. Schiller, ‘‘Jurisdiction Over Persons Abducted in
Violation of International Law in the Aftermath of United States v. AlvarezMachain’’ (1998) 5 UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 205 p. 208.
42
Methodologically speaking, the central obligation on states is probably to give
accused persons a fair trial. Adherents of mala captus advocate that this approach
does not violate that obligation, while adherents of abuse of process disagree. It is the
lack of any customary law clarity on this point to which I am referring.
43
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW p. 314, n. 109 and
accompanying text (6th ed., 2003); although to be faithful to Professor Brownlie’s
text, he ultimately describes mala captus bene detentus as ‘‘the view adopted by courts
in many states and by some writers’’ (ibid.). As prominent a jurist as Richard
Goldstone has rather blithely suggested that the rule is a ‘‘[principle] of customary
international law’’; R. Goldstone & J. Simpson, ‘‘Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism’’ (2003) 16 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 13, p. 19, where at fn. 33 the authors also oddly identify it as a ‘‘principle of
extradition law’’. On the other hand, it has been suggested that ‘‘customary international law prevents courts from exercising criminal jurisdiction over abducted
defendants,’’ though this argument is apparently unconvincing (Silvia Borelli,
‘‘Terrorism and Human Rights: Treatment of Terrorist Suspects and Limits on
International Co-operation’’ (2003) 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 803, p. 810, n. 34, citing
S. WILSKE, DIE VOLKERRECHTSWIDRIGE ENTFUHURUNG UND IHRE RECHTSFOLGEN (2000)).
44
The Trial Chamber in Nikolic´ pointedly observed, ‘‘…in general the maxim [mala
captus bene detentus] has been interpreted and commented upon in a much more
negative sense in academic circles than in legal practice’’ (Nikolic´ (Trial Chamber),
supra note 29, para. 78, fn. 79). This significantly understates the negative reaction to
Alvarez on the part of states as well as academics; see M. Feinrider and T. Marauhn,
‘‘Kidnapping’’, in R. Bernhardt, ed., 3 EPIL (1997), pp. 79–84; Mark S. Zaid, ‘‘Military
Might Versus Sovereign Right: The Kidnapping of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain
and the Resulting Fallout’’ (1997) 19 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 829, pp. 853–55.
41
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international courts have begun to address the issue, mala captus bene
detentus has experienced something of a revivification.
II ABDUCTION BEFORE ‘‘INTERNATIONAL’’ COURTS
2.1 Human Rights Bodies
Decisions of the human rights supervisory bodies are not exactly on
point with the current discussion, as they fulfil different functions
than either the national courts or the international criminal tribunals.
While abduction and illegal rendition may cause jurisdictional
inquiries in the latter fora, being the very courts which can try the
individuals, bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights and
the United Nations Human Rights Committee have a supervisory
function. At their most specific these courts will adjudge whether a
particular prosecution undertaken in spite of abduction or illegal
rendition was itself a violation of its constitutive human rights
instrument, or at least whether the mode of apprehension itself was
offensive.
However, as will be recalled from the discussion above, abduction
and forms of rendition that are not prescribed by law are generally
viewed as being human rights violations. While this has usually not
been a conclusive point in domestic cases on point, it is one that has
often warranted comment by courts inquiring into jurisdiction.
Accordingly, a brief summary of what might be called the ‘‘pure’’
human rights jurisprudence is warranted.
The human rights bodies have generally taken an approach which
mirrors that of the jurisdictions applying the ‘‘abuse of process’’
principle, certainly agreeing that the threshold issue is whether a state
should take (or, given the usual ex post facto scope of their decisions,
‘‘should have taken’’) jurisdiction at all in light of an abduction or
illegal rendition.45 As might be expected, these cases rest on the illegal
acts themselves as human rights violations, rather than speaking to
the inherent process of the court. In Lopez Burgos,46 for example, the
U.N. Human Rights Committee found a violation of Article 9(1) of
45

See, e.g. Stocke´ v. Federal Republic of Germany (European Commission of
Human Rights, 12 October 1989), 95 ILR 328, at 332–33; Garcia v. Ecuador (Human
Rights Committee), Comm. No. 319/1988, UN Doc. A/47/40 (1994), at 287–90;
Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay (Human Rights Committee), Comm. No. 56/1979,
UN Doc. A/36/40 (1981), at p. 185.
46
U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981), reprinted 68 ILR 29.
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the ICCPR where Uruguayan agents forcibly abducted an Uruguayan refugee from Argentina. In Bozano v. France,47 the European
Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 5(1) of the
ECHR where the petitioner was the victim of a disguised extradition,
having been seized in France and deported to Switzerland, whereupon he was extradited to Italy.
Borelli has pointed out an intriguing divergence between the
caselaw of the HRC and the ECHR on this topic:
… while according to the Human Rights Committee the attitude of the state whose
territorial sovereignty has been violated is irrelevant, the [ECHR] still seems inclined
to consider that the forcible abduction of a fugitive constitutes per se a violation of
the rights protected by the Convention only in the case where the authorities of the
territorial state do not consent to the abduction, and where the procedures put in
place by any existing extradition treaty have not been followed.48

This observation49 was recently confirmed by the ECHR Grand
Chamber’s judgment in Öcalan.50 In that case, the petitioner was a
prominent Kurdish leader who was sought by Turkish authorities to
face terrorism charges. He sought refuge in Kenya, which did not
have an extradition treaty with Turkey. Turkish authorities nonetheless obtained the cooperation of Kenyan government officials,
who surreptitiously delivered Öcalan to a Turkish aircraft in the
international zone of the Nairobi airport, where he was arrested.
Öcalan pleaded a violation of Article 5 of the European Convention, arguing that he had been subjected to abduction and/or
disguised extradition because his apprehension had not been in been
in accordance with ‘‘a procedure prescribed by law.’’ The Court,
however, found the arrest to be lawful, on the basis that: (1) Turkey
had validly issued several arrest warrants for Öcalan, and the formal
arrest itself complied with Turkish domestic law; (2) the Court had no
power of review vis-à-vis Kenyan law, so any violations thereof were

47

(1986) ECHR, Series A, No. 111; (1987) 9 European Human Rights Report 297.
Borelli, supra note 43, p. 807.
49
Based in part on that author’s reading of the lower chamber’s decision in the
same case discussed here (Öcalan v. Turkey, Appl. No. 00046221/99, Merits, Judgment of 12 March 2003). For commentary on the 2003 decision, see Annemarieke
Künzli, ‘‘Öcalan v. Turkey: Some Comments’’ (2004) 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 141.
50
Supra, note 6.
48
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not justiciable; and (3) on the evidence,51 the Kenyan government
had cooperated with the Turkish authorities in the apprehension, and
such cooperation was not prevented by the Convention in the absence
of specific violations of its provisions.52 The latter point is the
important one for present purposes, as the Court confirmed its
jurisprudence to the effect that violation of either the sovereignty of
the ‘‘refuge’’ state or of an existing extradition or other cooperative
arrangement between the two states is required for the arrest to be
deemed illegal.53
2.2 The ICTY and ICTR
Each of the UN ad hoc tribunals has asserted control over its jurisdiction, which includes supervision of the arrest and detention of
accused criminals. In this regard, something of a bifurcated ‘‘abuse of
process’’ doctrine has been developing.54 On the one hand, these
courts have shown explicit willingness to ‘‘fully exercise … supervisory powers over pre-trial human rights violations’’55 and provide
appropriate remedies. On the other hand, at least until the Appeals
Chamber’s decision in Nikolic´, the ICTY in particular showed itself
willing to seriously entertain the ability of an accused to plead violations of state sovereignty in his/her defence.56 This latter point is
consistent with the ‘‘abuse of process’’ approach in domestic illegal
rendition cases, where it is the illegality of executive conduct that
matters, rather than the traditional niceties of who has standing to
plead what law.

51

And, remarkably, despite a statement by the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs that there had been no official involvement in the arrest or transfer (Öcalan,
supra note 6, para. 98).
52
Öcalan, supra note 6, para. 86. See also at para. 87: ‘‘The fact that a fugitive has
been handed over as a result of cooperation between States does not in itself make
the arrest unlawful or, therefore, give rise to any problem under Article 5.’’
53
Öcalan, supra note 6, paras. 90 and 98.
54
See GEERT-JAN A. KNOOPS, SURRENDERING TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS:
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2002), Chapter VIII.
55
Göran Sluiter, ‘‘International Criminal Proceedings and the Protection of
Human Rights’’ (2003) 37 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 935, p. 944.
56
See Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October
1995), esp. para. 55.
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A detailed inquiry into the Tribunals’ approach to personal
jurisdiction is unwieldy and unnecessary in this article.57 A survey of
the highlights leading up to the Nikolic´ appeal should suffice.
i Dokmanović58
Dokmanović was the first Tribunal case to formally approach and
resolve the issue of illegal rendition of an indictee, in this case Slavko
Dokmanović who had been indicted for his role in the massacre at
Vukovar, eastern Croatia in 1991. Dokmanović was resident in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and because of the FRY’s
previous failures to surrender fugitives to the ICTY59 an official of
the Office of the Prosecutor lured him into Eastern Slavonia under
false pretenses, and he was arrested and transmitted to The Hague.
Dokmanović challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the basis of
his ‘‘illegal’’ arrest, which his submissions described as a ‘‘kidnapping’’ that had violated the sovereignty of the FRY.60 The Trial
Chamber dismissed the application, however, pointedly distinguishing between ‘‘luring’’ and ‘‘forcible abduction’’; the former was not
offensive to international law, in particular because there had been
‘‘no actual physical violation of FRY territory’’61 and Dokmanović
had come into Eastern Slavonia willingly. Abduction was conceded
to involve significantly more illegality, and the Chamber expressed
the view that it could ground a dismissal in a case where it was validly
raised.62
The distinction made by the Trial Chamber between luring and
abduction seems strained, founded as it was on the controversial view
that luring is not a sovereignty violation. Moreover, luring largely
57

The reader is commended to Knoops, supra note 54, along with other chapters
in that volume.
58
Prosecutor v. Mile Mrsksic´, Miroslav Radic´, Veselin Sljivancanin and Slavko
Dokmanovic´, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, T.Ch. II, 22 October 1997 (hereafter ‘‘Dokmanovic´’’).
For commentary, see Scharf, supra note 19.
59
Scharf, supra note 19, p. 370.
60
Dokmanovic´, supra note 58, paras. 16–18.
61
Dokmanovic´, supra note 58, para. 77. Professor Scharf expresses doubt
regarding this conclusion, based on the fact that the Prosecution official physically
went into FRY under false pretenses to accompany Dokmanović out of the jurisdiction (Scharf, supra note 19). Mann has opined that even luring without physical
intrusion is a sovereignty violation, at least as between states, apparently on the basis
of the effects doctrine (Mann, supra note 2, pp. 408–409).
62
Dokmanovic´, supra note 58, para. 77.
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amounts to disguised extradition, and has been described as a ‘‘de
facto [form] of abuse of process.’’63 The better view may be that the
force of the Security Council’s exercise of Chapter VII powers that
underpins the ICTY’s function effectively trumps any sovereignty
concerns, particularly with regard to a defaulting state.64 As explored
below, this level of comfort does not exist for the ICC.
ii Barayagwiza65
Barayagwiza was not an abduction or luring case, but is of interest
because the Appeals Chamber explicitly utilized the doctrine of abuse
of process in articulating the ability of the Tribunal to control its
process,66 which control explicitly reached back to pre-trial treatment
of the accused. Barayagwiza was legally arrested, but then detained
for an exceptionally long period and had his rights, both to prompt
information as to the charges against him and to habeas corpus,
violated. The Appeals Chamber explicitly linked the preservation of
the integrity of the proceedings with the pre-trial treatment of the
accused, and demonstrated its willingness to seize itself of human
rights violations and provide remedies therefor—though the power of
dismissal would be exercised ‘‘in light of serious and egregious
violations of the accused’s rights [that] would prove detrimental to
the court’s integrity.’’67 While the initial remedy provided to Barayagwiza was altered in a subsequent review requested by the Prosecutor,68 as Judge Sluiter has pointed out, ‘‘ÔBarayagwiza II’ did not in
any way affect the guiding principles established in ÔBarayagwiza
I’.’’69
63

Knoops, supra note 54, p. 245.
Accord, Scharf, supra note 19. This line of reasoning appeared to be at play
when Slobodan Milosević challenged his surrender to the ICTY, on the basis that he
had been surrendered by the government of the Republic of Serbia, rather than the
FRY (to which state the warrant had been issued). See Prosecutor v. Slobodan
Milosevic´, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary Motions, 8 November 2001,
paras. 35–47.
65
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, 3 November
1999 (hereafter ‘‘Barayagwiza’’).
66
Ibid., paras. 74–77. In Milosevic (supra note 64), the ICTY was also willing to
entertain the abuse of process defence as set out in Barayagwiza (see paras. 48–51).
67
Barayagwiza, supra note 65, para. 74.
68
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-A, Decision (Prosecutor’s
Request for Review or Reconsideration), 31 March 2000. See William Schabas,
‘‘Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor’’ (2000) 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 536.
69
Sluiter, supra note 55, p. 945, citing ‘‘Barayagwiza II’’, ibid., para. 28.
64
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iii Todorovic´70
Stevan Todorović was indicted by the ICTY for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and grave breaches stemming from the 1991–1993
period, when he was Chief of Police in Bosanski Samac, Bosnia and
Herzegovina. After his arrest by the NATO-led stabilization force
(SFOR), Todorović alleged that he had been kidnapped from his
home in Zlatibor, Western Serbia; that he had been blindfolded,
gagged and beaten with a baseball bat during the ‘‘kidnapping’’, after
which he was delivered by helicopter to SFOR; and that SFOR and
the Office of the Prosecutor had some involvement in his illegal
capture. He brought a series of motions designed to require SFOR
and the Prosecution to disclose relevant information, which were
opposed at every turn. Ultimately, the Trial Chamber ordered SFOR
to provide disclosure, including the identification of individuals who
had been involved in the capture, as well as issuing a subpoena for the
testimony of the Commanding General of SFOR.71 Soon after this
decision was rendered, Todorović entered into a plea agreement with
the Prosecution whereby he pleaded guilty to a single count and all
other charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment.72
The illegal capture issue, while it was the subject of argument by
both parties during the series of motions leading to the disclosure
decision,73 was never ruled upon by the Tribunal, and a result
Todorovic´ is of mostly historical interest for present purposes. It is
noteworthy that the Tribunal was willing to compel SFOR to provide
information regarding the circumstances of the arrest, which can be
viewed as further solidification of its control over all aspects of the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.

70

For a detailed review of the Todorovic matter, see Sloan, supra note 12, from
which this summary is drawn. See also J. Cogan, ‘‘International Criminal Courts and
Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects’’ (2002) 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111.
71
Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´ and
Simo Zaric´, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be
Provided by SFOR and Others, T.Ch., 18 October 2000.
72
Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovic´, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, T.
Ch., 31 July 2001. The Tribunal recently commuted Todorović’s sentence after he
served two-thirds of it, noting his guilty plea and agreement to assist the Tribunal
(Press Release, 29 June 2005, Registry Doc. JP/MOW/984e).
73
These arguments are reviewed in Sloan, supra note 12, and Lamb, supra note 12.

366

ROBERT J. CURRIE

iv Nikolic´
a) Trial Decision74
Dragan Nikolić was the first person to be indicted by the ICTY, in
relation to war crimes that were committed by him75 during his
tenure as commander of the Susica camp, a Bosnian Serb detention
centre in the Vlasenica region of eastern Bosnia. After his apprehension and arrest by SFOR, Nikolić made a motion similar to the
one in Todorovic´, arguing that his arrest had been illegal and
requesting dismissal of the charges. Interestingly, Nikolić and the
Prosecution agreed to proceed with the motion on the basis of an
agreed statement of facts, to the effect that: Nikolić had been abducted from the FRY by persons unknown, put into the trunk of a
car and smuggled across the border into Bosnia and Herzegovina; he
was then arrested uneventfully by an SFOR contingent; and, most
notably, there was no connection between SFOR, the Prosecution
and the abductors.76 Nikolić argued that his arrest had violated both
the sovereignty of FRY and his internationally-protected human
rights, as well as being an abuse of process, and that the only
appropriate remedy was dismissal and his return to (the by this time
renamed) Serbia and Montenegro.77
After a long and inconclusive discussion of national case law on
the mala captus bene detentus issue, the agreed statement of facts
proved fatal to the argument regarding sovereignty violation. While
the defence submitted that the actions of the unknown kidnappers
should be attributed to SFOR and/or the OTP78 the Trial Chamber
held that there were no factual links to justify attribution to either

74

Nikolic´ (Trial Chamber), supra note 29. For detailed commentary, see Sloan,
supra note 31.
75
Nikolić eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the Trial Chamber to 23
years’ imprisonment minus time already served (Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, Case
No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 18 December 2003). This
sentence was reduced to 20 years by the Appeals Chamber (Prosecutor v. Dragan
Nikolic´, Case No. IT-94-2-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, Appeals Chamber, 4
February 2005). On June 21, 2006 he was transferred to Italy to serve his sentence
(Press Release, Doc. CT/MOW/1091e, 23 June 2006).
76
Who had reportedly been convicted and sentenced in FRY for the abduction.
77
Nikolic´ (Trial Chamber), supra note 29, paras. 17, 25.
78
Relying on both the law of state responsibility, specifically Art. 11 of the
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (Nikolic´ (Trial Chamber), supra note 29, para. 60 ff.),
and on Mann’s argument about ‘‘ratification’’ (Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, No.
IT-94-2-PT, Defence Motion of 29 October 2001 at para. 15).
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body. It also emphasized the ‘‘vertical context’’ of the relationship
between the Tribunal and UN member states, stating that the ICTY’s
status ‘‘as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII’’ meant that
‘‘sovereignty by definition cannot play the same role’’.79
The defence fared no better in its request for dismissal on the basis
of human rights violations or abuse of process. The Trial Chamber
had generally invoked Barayagwiza for the proposition that it could
exercise control over personal jurisdiction,80 and did so again to
support its holding that for abuse of process to be made out, ‘‘it needs
to be clear that the rights of the Accused have been egregiously
violated.’’81 Undertaking a ‘‘balancing exercise’’82 of the relevant
factors, it noted that unlike the various Human Rights Committee
cases which had been referred to, there was no involvement by SFOR
or OTP in the abduction—which appeared to equate to a finding that
there been no human rights violations in the strict sense.83 Moreover,
while concern was expressed that some level of violence had been
done to Nikolić during his arrest, the facts did not disclose ‘‘very
serious mistreatment’’ which might justify dismissal.84 Accordingly,
the motion on jurisdiction was itself dismissed.
b) Appeal Decision85
The Appeals Chamber, presided over by Judge Theodor Meron,
took a drastic and unexpected approach to the illegal rendition issue:
the central inquiry was, assuming that there had been either a breach
of sovereignty or human rights, in what circumstances should the
79

Nikolic´ (Trial Chamber), supra note 29, para. 100. On this point I am in
agreement with Professor Sloan that ‘‘the Decision would have benefited from
consideration of whether there are … limits on the ICTY [in this regard], and, if so,
what they are and whether Nikolić’s capture in violation of the law of the FRY
violated them’’ (Sloan, supra note 31, pp. 549–550). As will be seen, however, the
Appeals Chamber’s decision rendered this issue moot.
80
Nikolic´ (Trial Chamber), supra note 29, para. 74.
81
Ibid., 111.
82
Ibid., 112.
83
Ibid., 111–113.
84
Though the court noted that, as had been held in Barayagwiza, it was ‘‘irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the
Appellant’s rights’’ (at para. 114, quoting Barayagwiza).
85
Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra note 8. For commentary, see Andrea Carcano, ‘‘The ICTY Appeal Chamber’s Nikolic´ Decision on Legality of Arrest: Can An
International Criminal Court Assert Jurisdiction Over Illegally Seized Offenders?’’
(2003) 13 ITALIAN YB. INT’L L. 77; James Sloan, ‘‘Breaching International Law to
Ensure Its Enforcement: The Reliance by the ICTY on Illegal Capture’’ (2003) 6 YB.
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 319.

368

ROBERT J. CURRIE

Tribunal decline to exercise jurisdiction?86 Once this standard was
determined, then the Court could inquire as to whether the present
facts would warrant this remedy, and if so whether ‘‘the underlying
violations are attributable to SFOR and by extension to the OTP.’’87
The framing of the threshold inquiry, of course, was an implicit
statement that the illegality of sovereignty or human rights breaches
was not enough, by itself, to warrant dismissal as a remedy, and this
theme coloured the Appeals Chamber’s fairly terse decision. On the
question of when a violation of state sovereignty would require dismissal, the Court used a fairly brief review of some of the prominent
cases from national courts88 to support its proposition that ‘‘it is
difficult to identify a clear pattern’’ on point.89 However, it relied in
particular upon Eichmann and Barbie90 as ‘‘cases concerning the same
kinds of crimes as those falling within the [ICTY’s] jurisdiction’’91 to
support an observation that state practice revealed courts finding ‘‘a
good reason for not setting aside jurisdiction’’ in such cases.92 It also
observed that courts were also more willing to take jurisdiction
‘‘absent a complaint by the State whose sovereignty has been breached or in the event of a diplomatic resolution of the breach’’.93
The bold twist came next. Emphasizing the importance of
achieving accountability for ‘‘Universally Condemned Offences’’ as
‘‘a necessary condition for the achievement of international justice,’’
the Court made a decisive policy declaration:
…the damage caused to international justice by not apprehending fugitives accused
of serious violations of international humanitarian law is comparatively higher than
the injury, if any, caused to the sovereignty of a State by a limited intrusion in its
territory, particularly when the intrusion occurs in default of the State’s cooperation.
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that in cases of universally
condemned offences, jurisdiction should be set aside on the ground that there was a

86

Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra note 8, para. 19.
Ibid.
88
Including Re Argoud (1964) 45 ILR 90 (Fr. Cour de Cassation), Alvarez-Machain, the older Swiss case of Jacob-Salomon (citing Preuss Lawrence, ‘‘Settlement of
the Jacob Kidnapping Case (Switzerland-Germany)’’ (1936) 30 AM. J. INT’L L. 123),
Ebrahim and Bennett.
89
Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra note 8, para. 24.
90
Federation nationale des deportes et internes resistants et patriots et autres c.
Barbie (1988) 78 ILR 125 (Cass. Crim., 1983).
91
Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra note 8, para. 23.
92
Ibid., 24.
93
Ibid.
87
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violation of the sovereignty of a State, when the violation is brought about by the
apprehension of fugitives from international justice, whatever the consequences for
the international responsibility of the State or organisation involved.94

Accordingly, even if SFOR had violated the sovereignty of the FRY,
jurisdiction would not be set aside.
The second question the Court posed was ‘‘under what circumstances does a human rights violation require jurisdiction to be set
aside?’’95 It validated the Trial Chamber’s approach (and its reliance
on Barayagwiza) which allowed for the possibility of dismissal
‘‘where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subject to
inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being
handed over to the Tribunal,’’96 observing in passing that this approach was consistent with Toscanino.97 It stated that ‘‘certain human rights violations are of such a serious nature’’ as to warrant
dismissal, though this remedy would ‘‘usually be disproportionate.’’
The balance to be struck was between ‘‘the fundamental rights of the
accused and the essential interests of the international community in
the prosecution of persons charged with serious violations of international humanitarian law.’’98 Based on the agreed facts,99 Nikolić
had not suffered such egregious treatment, and thus there was no
basis for dismissal on this ground either.
III ILLEGAL RENDITION AND THE ICC
3.1 Nikolic´: Mala Captus Bene Detentus (Redux?)
The point was made above that Eichmann is an effective starting
point for this discussion of illegal rendition. This is true in more ways
than one, since in Nikolic´, which is the latest and in some ways most
94

Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra note 8, para. 26. The Court also noted that
jurisdiction certainly would not be set aside where private actors acted privately in
carrying out the abduction, since there would be no violation of sovereignty (ibid.).
95
Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra note 8, para. 28 (title).
96
Ibid., citing the Trial Chamber decision at para. 114.
97
Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra note 8, para. 29; although the Trial Chamber
judgment clearly extended the remedy to situations where third parties were involved
in the abuses, unlike Toscanino which dealt only with abuses by or attributable to the
state.
98
Nikolic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra note 8, para. 30.
99
As well as on a rather mysterious proprio motu review (Nikolic´ (Appeals
Chamber), supra note 8, para. 31).

370

ROBERT J. CURRIE

authoritative court decision on the subject, we are presented with
Eichmann all over again. Again, a person accused of heinous crimes is
illegally abducted and tried; again, the court states that any violations
of international law that took place are essentially immaterial; again
the court takes personal jurisdiction in the face of a manifestly illegal
arrest, due in some part to the nature of the offences being tried. The
mala captus bene detentus rule is held to apply with particular force,
not as a matter of judicial disengagement from the international law
aspects of the matter, but as a means of validating illegality in arrest
as a necessary evil to combat even more pernicious crime.
The similarities between the two are somewhat cosmetic, however,
and even more complex than would appear. In Nikolic´, the Appeals
Chamber explicitly invoked Eichmann (as well as Barbie) for the proposition that state practice is somehow more accepting of mala captus bene
detentus where it is sought to prosecute the accused for ‘‘Universally
Condemned Offences.’’ However, as Professor Sloan has pointed out,100
the Israeli Supreme Court did not invoke the nature of the alleged offences as a means of supporting the mala captus bene detentus principle;
this was, in the court’s view, already well-established. Rather, the nature
of the offences was put forward as a means of validating the court’s
exercise of substantive jurisdiction over Eichmann, i.e. because the offences were so heinous they justified the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
on an extra-territorial basis. The invocation of Barbie can be dispensed
with in largely the same manner.101
Shorn of support from previous caselaw, then,102 the Appeal
Chamber’s approach is quite startling. Put simply, the interest in
effectively prosecuting the core international crimes outweighs any
messiness left behind: abduction or other manifestly illegal arrest,
notwithstanding the violation of domestic and international law this
entails; abuse of the human rights of the fugitive, which are protected
at both domestic and international law, unless such violations reach a
high threshold of overt physical abuse; or even violations of state
sovereignty, the central underpinning of the classical international
legal order. This remarkable expression of the weight behind the
goals of international criminal justice truly breaks new ground.103
100

Supra, note 85, p. 330, footnote 75.
Ibid., fn. 77.
102
Though similar to what Higgins put forward in her book; see HIGGINS, supra
note 20, pp. 72–73.
103
Thus, Carcano’s suggestion (supra, note 85) that the Appeals Chamber’s
findings may reflect customary international law must be seen as unsupportable.
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It is beyond doubt that Nikolic´ is a very significant decision, not
least because it somewhat unexpectedly validated an Alvarez-type
approach to abduction in the international criminal justice arena.
Post-Dokmanovic´, one commentator had remarked that the ‘‘precedents would suggest that an international criminal tribunal would
have to dismiss a case where the defendant has been abducted in
violation of international law’’104—a reasonable position in light of
the increasing swing towards the ‘‘abuse of process’’ approach. Instead, mala captus bene detentus is elevated from its former status as a
declining principle of domestic jurisdiction to being the new sword of
the international criminal legal order, cutting through virtually all of
the substantive and procedural concerns that might impair an international court’s ability to try an individual before it. Given the source
of the ruling, there is little doubt it will have significant persuasive
power in future cases.105
Is all as it should be? Certainly no tears are being shed for Dragan
Nikolić, whose guilty plea earned him a well-deserved prison sentence. What is difficult about the case, however, is that it reflects one
of the founding paradoxes of this ‘‘nascent’’106 discipline called
‘‘international criminal law.’’ On the one hand, the very idea of
criminal liability on an international scale is heavily rooted in human
rights concerns, as prototypical as human rights might have been
during the early part of the 20th century when the idea of international criminal liability was first being seriously mooted. The crimes
that are deemed to attract this level of opprobrium are primarily
those which entail human rights violations, both in the sense that they
offend very basic aspects of human dignity (race, freedom, gender
etc.) and that they are most likely to be carried out by state actors or
persons in a position of quasi-governmental power.107
On the other hand, for international criminal justice to have any
sense of legitimacy, it must be enforced in a manner that comports
with human rights standards—specifically, that the rights of the accused not be abused as part of the enforcement process. As Judge
Mansfield commented in Toscanino, ‘‘Society is the ultimate loser
104

Michael Scharf, ‘‘The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the
New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal’’ (2000) 49 Depaul L Rev.
925, p. 970.
105
Accord, Carcano, supra note 85.
106
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW xxxv (2003).
107
This will often factually be the case, though it is not any kind of requirement;
private persons may commit genocide, crimes against humanity, etc.
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when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead to
decreased respect for the law.’’108
Thus, oddly but necessarily, respect for the rule of law is the
animating concept for both sides of this issue. Those who feel that
abduction should not preclude prosecution will argue that upholding
the rule of law means ensuring that people who commit such atrocious crimes are held responsible, so as to serve both the deterrent
and punitive purposes of the criminal law. Those who feel that the
abduction should preclude prosecution will argue that the rule of law
means discouraging lawlessness on the part of those enforcing the
criminal law; and, that human rights abuse and overt criminality
should not be a part of the enforcement process, because allowing
them undermines the legitimacy of international criminal justice.
In Nikolic´ the Appeals Chamber was faced with a situation
where it had to rule that one of the above perspectives was to
dominate, and given the facts of the case the actual result is fairly
reasonable. However, the test put forward by the court places the
threshold for obtaining jurisdictional relief far higher than was
necessary to decide the fate of Nikolić himself, and was clearly
designed to preclude further defence motions of this sort. Moreover, the logical implications are fairly stark. For example, if State
A sends its police or agents into the territory of State B where they
violently abduct a fugitive, then so long as State A can present the
individual to the Tribunal there will be no jurisdictional problems
(absent serious physical abuse). That A has violated the territorial
integrity of B is of no moment, even supposing relations between
these states are already fractious and the abduction might provoke
an international incident.
As a result, the tension between competing interests of justice
described above produces a troubling circularity: international
criminal law upholds human rights by trying those who violate
them egregiously, yet we are prepared to countenance human
rights violations in order to facilitate the trials. The difference, we
are told, is one of degree; the interest in trying alleged ge´nocidaires
108

United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (Ct. App. 2nd Circ., 1974), at 274. As
the Hon. R. Roy McMurtry, Chief Justice of Ontario (now retired) recently noted,
guardians of the rule of law have a duty to ensure ‘‘that law enforcement is conducted according to law, that we have more than law and order in that we have
ordered liberty according to law’’ (Symons Lecture on the State of Canadian Confederation, delivered in Charlottetown, November 9, 2005, available online (in
excerpt) at: < http://cleonet.ca/news/267>).
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and perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity
counter-balances the other violations of both sovereignty and
international human rights. Physical abuse of the offender might
swing the balance the other way, but only if it is ‘‘inhuman, cruel
or degrading’’ to a sufficiently shocking degree—the sort of egregious standard of conduct that would itself attract prosecution of
the captor for a crime against humanity, were it widespread and
systematic rather than specific to one instance. Accordingly, the
international human rights of the offender are implicitly ordered:
the right to be free from cruel physical treatment is upheld, but
freedom from arbitrary/illegal arrest and interference with physical
integrity are not as important. Under the Nikolic´ test, the threat to
international peace and security that these offenders pose is more
significant than the inter-state conflict their arrest might engender,
even though that inter-state conflict might itself threaten peace and
security.
The ultimate effect, then, is similar to that suggested by Professor
Bassiouni with regard to Alvarez and similar U.S. cases: the court
does not condone the illegal conduct by enforcement authorities, but
removes any consequences that might accrue.109 In one swoop it
settles the issue of whether individuals have standing to raise violations of sovereignty—holding, if implicitly, that they do—but finds
that such violations do not matter.
3.2 Why the Nikolic Test Should Not Be Used by the ICC
As will be seen, the position put forth here is that the Nikolic´ test
is mostly inappropriate for use by the ICC. The reason for this is
twofold: first, it is not at all clear that the Appeals Chambers
decision is ‘‘correct’’ in law (to the extent this criticism can be
made in a situation where this level of court faced this issue for
the first time). Second, using the Nikolic´ test has the potential to
be destructive of the ICC’s important mission, because of the
unique relationship between the Court, state parties to the Rome
Statute and, most importantly, non-party states. In fact, the very
features that make Nikolic´ a workable test for the ICTY are what
make it unsuitable for the ICC. These reasons are essentially
woven together in the argument that follows.

109

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 2, pp. 262–280.
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i Illegally Arrested Persons Under the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute is silent as to the impact, if any, of abduction. The
only provisions with any bearing on the current discussion concern
the legality of arrest and human rights standards attaching thereto.
Article 59(1) obliges states to arrest fugitives upon request from the
Court, but ‘‘in accordance with the law of that state,’’ while 59(2)
obliges the arresting state to have its ‘‘competent judicial authority’’
determine, ‘‘in accordance with the law of that State, that:…(b) The
person has been arrested in accordance with the proper process; and
(c) The person’s rights have been respected.’’ As Swart comments,
‘‘Article 59 does not accord an additional right to the person arrested
to have the lawfulness of his arrest or detention reviewed by a court.
Such a right may nevertheless follow from human rights conventions
to which the requested State is a party.’’110
As to those human rights standards, Article 55(1) of the Rome
Statute provides inter alia that anyone being investigated ‘‘shall not
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.’’ Article 21(3), dealing
with the applicable law to be applied by the Court, says that application and interpretation of law ‘‘must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights.’’
What is missing from the Rome Statute is any entitlement of the
requested state to decline to surrender a fugitive on the basis of an
illegal arrest of some sort. This sets up an interesting dynamic between member states and the Court, since the surrender obligation
would appear to override any domestic extradition/surrender law
that might allow a court to decline to surrender because of abduction
or illegal arrest. It seems clear that the intention is for the ICC to deal
with any arrest irregularities itself. This is supported by Article 85(1),
which states that ‘‘Anyone who has been the victim of an unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation,’’
which anticipates the Court itself being the arbiter of this question.111
As to challenges to the Court’s personal jurisdiction, Article
19(2)(a) speaks to the possibility of the accused challenging the
jurisdiction of the Court. What is not clear is whether this extends to
challenging jurisdiction ratione personae. Article 85 speaks only to the
possibility of compensation for illegal arrest, and there does not seem
110

B. Swart, ‘‘Arrest Proceedings in the Custodial State’’ in THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Vol. II (A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D.
Jones, eds , 2002), p. 1252.
111
See generally S. Zappalà, ‘‘Compensation to An Arrested or Convicted Person’’ in Cassese et al., eds., ibid., at 1577.
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to be any specific mechanism in the Statute or the Rules of Procedure
to address this question.112
Starting from first principles, however, points towards a definite
answer. The ICC must, like any other court, have the ability to
control its own process and to address any abuse of its process—up
to, and including, the ability to impose dismissal as a remedy. This is
a matter of simple credibility for any court, and goes to basic notions
of legality; as Professor Morgenstern wrote many decades ago, ‘‘[I]t is
the duty of courts to administer the law with an eye not only to the
merits of each individual case but also to higher considerations of
legality.’’113 Both the ICTY and ICTR have invoked such inherent/
implied powers, including the ability to remedy abuse of process,
though it is not spoken to in their respective Statutes or Rules of
Evidence and Procedure.114
Moreover, it is highly arguable that the right to be free from
arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as other civil rights geared
towards fair trial, have status as customary international law and
must be respected by the ICC as by any other judicial body.115 The ad
hoc tribunals were certainly prepared to do so, notwithstanding the
disconnect between the expansive approach taken in Barayagwiza
and the Nikolic´ test. Given that article 21(3) of the Rome Statute
binds the Court to apply international human rights law, it must be
the case, as Judge Sluiter puts it, that ‘‘the trial forum must take
account of every human rights violation that occurs in the framework
of the criminal proceedings.’’116 Thus, the ICC must at least make an
inquiry (probably under 21(3)) into whether the circumstances of an
accused’s arrest and detention can and should have an effect on its
exercise of jurisdiction.

112

It is worth noting that the Prosecutor has discretion under Article 53 not to
prosecute where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, though this is not
a ‘‘jurisdictional’’ power.
113
F. Morgenstern, ‘‘Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International
Law’’ (1952) 29 BRIT. YB. INT. L. 265, p. 281.
114
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (2006), pp.
112–116, 539–542.
115
Sluiter, supra note 55.
116
Ibid., at 942. Accord, Kenneth S. Gallant, ‘‘Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and
Jurisdiction to Prescribe in International Criminal Courts’’ (2003) 48 VILLANOVA L.
REV. 763, p. 797.
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ii The Relationship Between the ICC and States: Vertical, Horizontal
or Lateral?
In recent writing on the nature and features of international criminal
justice mechanisms, it has been popular to contrast the ‘‘horizontal’’
model of inter-state criminal cooperation with the ‘‘vertical’’ model
pertaining to supra-national courts.117 The former pertains to the
traditional mode of inter-state cooperation by way of treaty, usually
governing extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters,
while the latter speaks to the authority of the ‘‘international judicial
body’’118 to issue and enforce binding orders to states to cooperate.
‘‘Horizontally’’, states function as sovereign equals and agree to
cooperate; ‘‘vertically’’ the ICTY, for example, bears the imprimateur
of the UN Security Council and (at least nominally) may compel
states to deliver both individuals and evidence.119
While these terms are usually used to describe the system of
cooperation at play,120 they can be used in a more general way to
describe the manner in which questions regarding jurisdiction, particularly personal jurisdiction, are resolved.121 Under the inter-state
‘‘horizontal’’ model states may individually exercise jurisdiction over
a matter with which they have a ‘‘real and substantial connection’’ by
way of a jurisdictional principle recognized at international law
(territorial, nationality, universal, etc.). Problems stemming from
concurrent jurisdiction are resolved by recourse to international law
rules and, realistically, to political wrangling. Under the ‘‘vertical’’
model the supra-national courts, such as the ICTY and ICTR, have
concurrent jurisdiction over crimes but can invoke primacy and take
jurisdiction of a case and individual from a national court as a
function of the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers.122
117

See generally A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 355–56 (2003); B.
Swart, ‘‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance—General Problems’’ in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Vol. II (A. Cassese, P.
Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones, eds , 2002), pp. 1592–1605.
118
CASSESE, ibid., p. 356.
119
Scharf, supra note 19, p. 375; Gallant, supra note 116, p. 806.
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See also A. Cassese, ‘‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some
Preliminary Observations’’ (1999) 10 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 144, p. 164.
121
For an example of this kind of analysis (though one that does not use the
descriptors in this way), see Mark A. Drumbl, ‘‘Looking Up, Down and Across: The
ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order’’ (2003) 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1037.
122
ICTY Statute Art. 9, ICTR Statute Art. 8. See generally Adolphus G. KaribiWhyte, ‘‘The Twin Ad Hoc Tribunals and Primacy Over National Courts’’
(1998–1999) 9 CRIM. L. FORUM 55.
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How to define the nature of the relationship between the ICC and
states, both in terms of jurisdiction and cooperation, has been a
challenge. In general terms, whether the Rome Statute represents a
simple compromise of state sovereignty or an illegitimate and
undemocratic effort has been controversial.123 Jurisdictionally, the
Court’s sui generis nature is summed up in the term ‘‘complementarity,’’ a word not found in the Rome Statute but which nonetheless
conveys the manner in which Article 17 of that Statute functions.124
Describing the cooperation regime has been more of a puzzle. As with
much of the Rome Statute, there is much that is familiar but much
that is new. While Judge Sluiter refers to the ICC’s ‘‘‘‘still predominantly hierarchical, vertical, nature’’125 others find that the Court has
both ‘‘horizontal’’ and ‘‘vertical’’ features.126 Professor Cassese famously emphasized the dependence of the Court on state cooperation
by calling it a ‘‘giant without arms and legs,’’ which ‘‘needs artificial
limbs to walk and work.’’127 ICC Prosecutor Luis Ocampo described
the Court as ‘‘independent and interdependent at the same time’’.128
What is clear, however, is that the relationship between the ICC
and the international community is a different one altogether, not
least because the Court is ultimately going to have legal dealings
with its member states, non-member states, other international
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See generally Dominic McGoldrick, ‘‘Political and Legal Responses to the
ICC’’ in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
(Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly, eds., 2004), 389, pp. 441–49.
124
There is no need to canvass the particulars of, or the massive literature
regarding, the ICC’s complementarity regime here. Suffice it to note for present
purposes that the ICC’s jurisdiction over a case is not primary, but will be taken only
where a State party is ‘‘unwilling’’ or ‘‘unable’’ to do so.
125
Göran Sluiter, ‘‘The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal
Court’’ (2003) 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, p. 651.
126
Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi and Hakan Friman, ‘‘The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court’’ (2000) 3 YB. INT. HUM. L.
289, pp. 328–329; Swart, supra note 117, p. 1594.
127
A. Cassese, ‘‘On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’’ (1998) 9 EUR. J. INT’L.
L. 2, p. 13.
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Statement of the Prosecutor at the Second Session of the Assembly of States
Parties, The Hague, 9 Sept 2003, as cited in Dominic McGoldrick, ‘‘The Legal and
Political Significance of a Permanent International Criminal Court’’ in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES (Dominic
McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly, eds., 2004), 453, p. 477.
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organizations and the UN by way of the Security Council.129 The
ICC was created by treaty, and its jurisdiction is mostly limited to the
territories or nationals of its parties.130 The nature of its birth was
highly political, and as a result the principles which underpin its
operation are complex and unique, bearing the hallmarks of the
many unresolved controversies that went into it.131 This complexity is
reflected in much of the early scholarship on the nature of the court
which, while successfully analyzing and describing the network of
functional relationships between the ICC and various stakeholders in
the international community, was less successful in trying to define it.
Accordingly, it may be useful to identify, if not a new paradigm,
then at least a new label that defines the unique set of relationships
within which the ICC exists. A term that suggests itself is ‘‘lateral’’.
Without delving too deeply into dictionary definitions of the
term,132 it is appealing because it evokes a sort of continuum, where
the Court and states are always to one side of each other. Certainly
as between the Court and member states the relationship is not
‘‘horizontal,’’ as the member states do bear certain obligations to
surrender jurisdiction to the Court in some circumstances and are
obligated to cooperate with the Court in various ways when this
occurs. Neither, however, is the relationship ‘‘vertical,’’ as there is a
substantial measure of primacy accorded to the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction by the states themselves, and even the cooperation
obligations are tempered and qualified in various ways that differentiate the relationship from that, say, between the ICTY and UN
member states.
While no attempt will be made to be exhaustive, it may be useful
to elaborate on the ‘‘lateral’’ nature of these relationships in more
detail. The uniqueness of the complementarity regime is itself a good
129

See generally on this point the excellent article by Kenneth Gallant, ‘‘The
International Criminal Court in the System of States and International Organizations’’ (2003) 16 LEIDEN J. INT. L. 553.
130
Rome Statute, articles 12(2)(a) and (b). The Court may also exercise jurisdiction over crimes where a non-party state has agreed to let it do so (article 12(3)), or
where the UN Security Council has referred the matter to the Court (article 13(b)).
131
As Professor Cassese has remarked, the Rome Statute is ‘‘markedly different
from other modern multilateral treaties. It bears the mark of strong political and
diplomatic differences over certain major issues, and shows the difficulty of ironing
them out’’ (Cassese, ‘‘Preliminary Observations’’, supra note 120, p.145).
132
But see the Oxford Handy Dictionary, (6th ed., 1986): ‘‘Of, at, towards, from,
the side(s)…’’ And, intriguingly, ‘‘~thinking, seeking to solve problems by apparently
illogical methods.’’
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example, since functionally it means that the ICC has neither primacy
nor complete subservience to the jurisdiction of state courts. Article
17 of the Rome Statute formally presumes that a case over which the
Court can properly take jurisdiction is admissible but compels the
Court to defer to a state party which has jurisdiction and is investigating/prosecuting—unless that state is demonstrably ‘‘unable’’ or
‘‘unwilling’’ genuinely to pursue the case. The Court makes its own
determination of whether or not a case is admissible (including the
highly-contentious issue of unwillingness), but states can challenge
both the initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor133 and
admissibility generally.134 The Prosecutor must suspend any ongoing
investigations while such a challenge is being made,135 but the state is
ultimately bound by the Court’s decision on the matter.
The convoluted design of the complementarity regime was deliberate, the objective being both to create opportunities for legitimate
international criminal trials, and ‘‘to encourage national institutions
to comply with their responsibilities under international humanitarian law to investigate and prosecute’’.136 This, arguably, is the ‘‘lateral’’ effect of complementarity—in the sense of a lateral pass on the
rugby pitch, where the player best-placed to pursue the objective is
handed the ball, but with more of a compulsory flavour. If a state
cannot or will not take jurisdiction, then the ICC will do so, but it is
this very potentiality that will encourage states to pursue cases, and in
a manner that will not be found to be ‘‘unwilling’’.137 The design is
deliberate, as well, in that it displays a built-in sensitivity to the
political concerns that motivated the negotiators, which ranged from
reluctance for a Court that could impinge upon state sovereignty to
the imperative of empowering the Court to intervene when states
were unable to prosecute or chose to shield a perpetrator.138 These
political concerns are now enshrined in a set of provisions that will
133

Rome Statute, art. 18.
Rome Statute, art. 19.
135
Rome Statute, art. 19(7).
136
McGoldrick, ‘‘Legal and Political Significance,’’ supra note 128, p. 468,
referring to JI Charney, ‘‘International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic
Courts’’ (2001) 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 120, who opines that this was the effect of the
ICTY and ICTR.
137
Accord, Drumbl, supra note 121, at 1042, n. 25.
138
For a compelling and detailed account of the negotiations on this point, see
John T. Holmes, ‘‘The Principle of Complementarity,’’ in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS (Roy S. Lee, ed., 1999), 41.
134
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clearly give rise to a great deal of political and legal wrangling. As
Professor Schabas has commented, ‘‘the two systems [of national
courts and the ICC] function in opposition and to some extent hostility with respect to each other’’,139 which means that even relations
between the Court and state parties (and among state parties) will be
delicate—to say nothing of relations with non-party states.140
The lateral aspect is perhaps even better reflected in various parts
of the Rome Statute’s regime on cooperation and surrender.141 The
vertical-seeming starting point is that states ‘‘shall, in accordance
with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in
its investigation and prosecution of crimes’’,142 and must ensure that
there are national procedures which provide for all of the forms of
cooperation set out in the Statute.143 Where the Pre-Trial Chamber
determines that there is no competent mechanism or authority to
respond to a cooperation request, it may even authorize the Prosecutor to conduct investigations on the territory of a party state,
without that state’s consent.144
Closer examination reveals, however, that the cooperation scheme
is not so much a framework of obligations as a compendium of
‘‘sophisticated instruments of conflict resolution.’’145 Some of the
more prominent examples of these are:
– a state party is normally under an obligation to surrender an
individual requested by the Court (Art. 89(1)), but may give priority to competing state requests in certain circumstances (Art. 90),

139

WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
85 (2nd ed., 2004).
140
Or the Security Council, since a referral of a case by this body tilts the Courtstate relationship into far more ‘‘vertical’’ territory than is otherwise the case (see
Rome Statute, art. 13(b)).
141
Here I rely heavily on the thorough analysis of the cooperation provisions in
Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kreb, ‘‘Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises’’ (1999) 2 YB. INT’L
HUMANITARIAN L. 143; but see also Phakiso Mochochoko, ‘‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’’ in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 138,
p. 305; Jackson N. Maogoto, ‘‘A Giant Without Limbs: The International Criminal
Court’s State-Centric Cooperation Regime’’ (2004) 23 UNIV. QUEENSLAND L. J. 102.
142
Rome Statute, art. 86.
143
Rome Statute, art. 88.
144
Rome Statute, art. 57(3)(d). See also art. 99(4).
145
Kaul and Kreb, supra note 141, p. 170.
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with similar provisions in relation to other forms of assistance (Art.
93(9)(a));
where there are parallel national proceedings against the individual
for a different crime, ‘‘the requested state may not refuse the execution of the request but the execution may be postponed for a
period of time as agreed upon with the Court’’ (Arts. 89(4) and
94);146
despite Art. 88, there are numerous references to requests for
surrender and assistance being rendered in accordance with the law
of the state party (e.g. Arts. 89(1), 93(1));
numerous instances where the Court and state party will ‘‘consult’’
as to the form, procedure and scope of a request for assistance (e.g.
Art. 91(4));
in particular, if a request is ‘‘prohibited in the Requested state on
the basis of an existing fundamental legal principle of existing
application,’’ the State must consult with the Court to try to
negotiate a modified request that would be acceptable (Art. 93(3)),
though it appears that the State may ultimately refuse the request;
a state party must consult with the Court where executing a request
would potentially violate ‘‘a pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken with respect to another State’’ (Art. 97);
a state party may ‘‘postpone’’ executing a request by the Court
where so doing would interfere with an ongoing investigation in
that state (Art. 94), or where an admissibility challenge is pending
(Art. 95);
with regard to on-site investigations, the Court has different
powers as between the state on whose territory the crime is alleged
to have been committed (Art. 99(4)(a)), and other state parties
(Art. 99(4)(b)); the latter provision has been described as ‘‘fall[ing]
short of a consent requirement but go[ing] beyond mere consultation’’;147
a detailed regime governing consultations between the Court and a
state party that views a request as being directed towards ‘‘national
security information’’ (Art. 72);148
146

Kaul and Kreb, supra note 141, p. 166, describing the effect of these provisions
as ‘‘constructive ambiguity.’’
147
Ibid., at 169.
148
This is more properly framed as a rule of evidence, since it is included in Part 6
of the Statute. See generally Donald K. Piragoff, ‘‘Protection of National Security
Information’’ in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE, supra note 138, p. 270.
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– while the obligations to cooperate are vertical in form, a failure to
cooperate only allows the Court to ‘‘make a statement to this effect’’ and refer the matter—laterally, perhaps—to the Assembly of
States Parties. At this point, state responsibility for treaty violation
governs.149
iii The Destructive Potential of Nikolic´ in a Lateral System
The system, then, is one of mutual support (and doubtless no little
friction) between the Court and state parties. The Rome Statute
envisions a Court with some power but mandates ongoing consultations and negotiations as the mode by which the criminal justice
work gets done in the pre-trial phase. Formally states must cooperate, but there are roadblocks to be thrown up and some provisions
that may amount to grounds for refusal of a Court request. Both
vertical and horizontal approaches were combined, and distorted, in
order to produce a mutually agreeable package. The Court and its
members work laterally, in parallel fashion, ostensibly moving towards the same goal of ensuring international crime is punished and
impunity extinguished. To a much greater extent than with the ad hoc
tribunals, however, politics is the driver.
Why is the lateral nature of the ICC of such importance? Put
simply, the nature of the relationship between the ICC and the
international community is the key determinant on the issue of the
fate of abducted fugitives before the Court. It is also, in my submission, the key disqualifier of the use of Nikolic´ test by the ICC at
such time as the issue comes before it.
On the latter point, it seems reasonable to expect that the Court
will at some point have to make a decision about whether to dismiss
an indictment because of abduction or other illegal arrest or rendition. This potential was contemplated by the framers of the Rome
Statute, as Article 85 makes clear. Before the ICTY alone, Slavko
Dokmanović, Slobodan Milosević, Stevan Todorović and Dragan
Nikolić all made the argument in one form or another. Moreover,
history tells us, from Eichmann to Alvarez to Bennett to Nikolić, that
law enforcement authorities and other ‘‘interested’’ individuals will
resort to illegal arrest in some form in order to apprehend fugitives
who are of particular interest.
Further, in the context of the sorts of crimes of which the ICC will
seize itself, the perpetrators will truly deserve the label hostis humani
149
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generis (enemies of humanity), and thus the interest in apprehending
them will be intense—all the more relevant here because it is relatively
easy to envision situations where abduction would become an
attractive prospect. Writing of the ICTY experience, Professor Scharf
has made the point that even in a vertical system states will fail to
comply with orders to surrender fugitives.150 Thus, even where a
matter comes before the Court by way of a Security Council referral,
there is reason to suspect that apprehension will never be easy. This is
compounded by one of the manifest frailties of the ICC’s lateral
system: the Court may very well be forced to try to induce cooperation from the very governments whose members it is trying to
prosecute.151 Accordingly, the prospect of a national leader who
engages the Court in a protracted dispute about admissibility of a
case in order to maintain his or her own impunity is real. The Court
itself has no effective enforcement regime and can simply refer the
matter to the Assembly of States parties, whose only power appears
to be ‘‘naming and shaming.’’152 In such circumstances, the possibility of abduction would also be real.
Scenarios involving non-party states are equally disturbing. The
national leader from the previous scenario, if he or she chose to flee
the party state, would most likely flee to a non-ICC member state,
particularly one where some sanctuary and freedom from prosecution
would be offered. Other situations where a perpetrator whose crimes
come within the Court’s jurisdiction are possible, e.g. a senior military official commits war crimes on a member state’s territory and
then flees to his home state, which is not an ICC member. One can
easily imagine circumstances in which vengeful politicians in a postconflict or post-dictatorship government were motivated enough by
an individual’s crimes to employ their own forces—or bounty hunt150
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ers—to apprehend their otherwise unreachable quarry. Indeed, in
such situations abduction followed by surrender to the ICC would
not be the worst fate that could befall the fugitive, but the Court
would still have to adjudicate upon the issue.
It is not only the prospect of abduction itself, or illegal arrest,
or even rough handling of fugitives that should give one pause in
these situations, though they are very questionable and generally
abhorrent practices. The demonstrable corrosive effect that interstate abduction has on international relations is a significant
worry. As noted above, Eichmann’s abduction sparked an international incident that led to a Security Council resolution. The
Alvarez matter created such interstate friction in North America
that both Mexico and Canada intervened in the U.S. Supreme
Court hearing in opposition to the American government’s position. In more politically unstable regions, it is not difficult to
imagine that the abduction of an ICC-indicted but much-loved
national leader from one state might lead to a political—and
potentially military—showdown between one or more states,
possibly even playing into the hands of third states who have some
interest in maintaining instability in the region. While it is not at
all inevitable that an abduction could create a threat to international peace and security, it is certainly a live possibility.153
The Appeals Chamber’s approach in Nikolic´ has a certain carte
blanche, ‘‘hang the consequences’’ flavour, adopting as it does the
view that international crime in the form of universally-condemned
offences represents a greater threat to international peace and security
than the prospect of states invading each others’ territory to abduct
wanted individuals. I submit that this was a finding that was relatively
easy for the ICTY to make, given that it has the weight of the
Security Council behind it and that, at least in the case of Nikolić
himself, the state of refuge was essentially in default of its obligation
to surrender the fugitive to the Tribunal. The ICTY is itself an arm of
the Security Council, an embodiment of collective measures, clothed
with a great deal of moral and legal authority that might even extend
to prioritizing between threats to international security (at least
insofar as they affect its own exercise of jurisdiction). It can, perhaps,
afford to take a permissive approach to acts which violate both state
sovereignty and international human rights law.
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The situation is entirely different with the lateral and highly
political nature of the ICC. At its starkest, the Nikolic´ test essentially
encourages abduction. Interested states would correctly judge that,
unlike many domestic systems, an illegal abduction of the accused for
law enforcement purposes will cause no difficulty with prosecution, so
long as the fugitive is not significantly physically abused. The use of a
Nikolic´-type test by the ICC would therefore increase the already
reasonable chance that there will be abductions of indictees.
In the lateral system, however, the case for of universally condemned offences as the overarching threats to international peace and
order cannot be made with either the legal or normative force that it
was by the ICTY in Nikolic´. While the ICC has a large number of
state parties, it is by no means a universal treaty; third party states
will inevitably be engaged, since international criminals will not
necessarily respect borders. The state parties, moreover, exist as
sovereign equals in what is essentially a glorified treaty regime. The
obligations under the Rome Statute are for parties to cooperate with
the Court, even to the point of surrendering jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances, but those obligations are ultimately owed to the
state parties themselves. The lack of ‘‘verticality’’ deprives ICC proceedings of some of the moral suasion that attaches to the ad hoc
tribunals.
Thus, there are many grounds for destructive friction as a result.
One can imagine a situation where the Court is involved in an
admissibility tussle with party state X which insists it is engaged in a
bona fide investigation of an individual, but the Court disagrees and
has requested surrender. An abduction of the individual by party
state Y would throw fuel on that particular fire, creating conflict both
between the two party states involved (for the sovereignty violation)
and between party state X and the ICC—the former no doubt
accusing the latter of illegally taking/accepting personal jurisdiction
over the fugitive.
Abduction could also create problems within the domestic process
for surrender, which in many states involves both judicial and ministerial reviews of all of the circumstances involving the request. As
noted above, Article 59(2) of the Rome Statute actually obliges
national governments to implement a review of the circumstances of
any indictee’s arrest. In Canada, for example, where the surrender
process is assimilated to the domestic extradition procedure,154 any
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request for surrender by the ICC will engage a judicial hearing
wherein it is well-established that the judge is competent both to
scrutinize the process for compliance with domestic human rights
norms,155 and to adjudicate claims of abuse of process.156 Particularly under the latter heading, it would be entirely within the discretion of the extradition court to dismiss the surrender proceedings
where the circumstances of the fugitive’s detention were manifestly
illegal, particularly if domestic or foreign police forces were implicated. Yet this would likely put Canada in violation of its obligation
to surrender the fugitive to the Court, certainly creating a difficult
political climate between the Court, the state parties and Canada. An
abduction and its attendant problems could not be ruled out.157
Further, those ‘‘attendant problems’’ could have extremely serious
consequences where non-party states to the ICC are involved. The
most obvious hypotheticals are where a party state abducts a fugitive
from a non-party state, or where the fugitive is a national of a nonparty state regardless of the site of the abduction. The violation of
sovereignty, while a potentially serious matter, would simply be the
starting point for resulting conflict. Those states which have not
signed the Rome Statute have generally expressed serious reservations about the legality of the Court generally, and many (notably the
U.S.) have been quite vociferous in expressing the view that the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over a national of a non-party
state would be unlawful.158 If the ICC has a blanket policy towards
jurisdiction similar to that in Nikolic´, and if the U.S. is indeed the
injured state in question, this raises the prospect of that state
directing even more of its energies towards undermining the
Court—possibly engaging the Security Council (the Permanent
155
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Members of which are mostly non-signatories to the ICC) to do so, or
even taking more extreme measures.159 The best possible resolution
would be the Security Council making a request under Article 16 for
the Court to defer the proceeding, but if this was done simply to quell
inter-state arguments about a particular fugitive, it would undermine
what moral authority the Court enjoys in the international community.
I should not be heard to suggest that every abduction or illegal
rendition that might occur under the bailiwick of the ICC is such a
nightmare scenario, though nightmare scenarios are well within the
realm of possibility. The important point is that the ICC, for all the
importance of its mission, is in a politically precarious environment
and should implement and apply its legal regime in a way that does
not undermine its own mandate, or indeed its very existence. If the
Court stays in operation for a significant period of time, then the
abduction of an accused person is a near-inevitability. The Court will
have to deal with this very difficult jurisdictional issue, and in a
manner that is consistent with the unique requirements of international criminal justice. Adopting a Nikolic´-type stance that will see
virtually all abducted or illegally arrested fugitives face process,
however, has the strong potential to defeat the Court’s mission by: (1)
tilting the uncertain balancing which is inherent in international
criminal justice too far towards substantive justice at the expense of a
process which requires adherence to human rights standards; and (2)
undermining the very foundations, as well as the work, of the ICC by
fanning the flames of disagreement about its existence and jurisdiction. As best it can, the Court should strive to walk a line which
avoids this potential, while at the same time combating impunity for
the enemies of humanity who will face its process.
IV

CONCLUSION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Ironically enough, if the Nikolic´ line of reasoning prevails before the
ICC there may be certain cases where prosecuting universally
159
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condemned offences will create threats to international peace and
security—different from those underpinning the offence itself but no
less destructive for that. The prospect of dousing a smaller fire only to
start a larger one is troubling, but very real. Even the more ‘‘minor’’
political conflicts can only hurt the cause, legitimacy and credibility
of a Court which already has to operate in a highly-charged political
atmosphere; if it is seen to be encouraging or approving of international illegality, then the Court may very well play into the hands of
those who view it as a politicized and biased forum.160 A wholesale
application of the mala captus bene detentus rule should have no
future before the ICC.
However, as critical as the foregoing has been regarding the
Appeal Chamber’s approach in Nikolic´, and in particular its portability beyond the UN tribunal system, that decision nonetheless
provides some guideposts for formulating an approach to abduction
that is specifically tailored to the new international criminal justice
order embodied in the ICC. It is worthwhile to recall again that
Dragan Nikolić was the first individual indicted by the ICTY and was
certainly deserving of the label hosti humanis generii. The persons
indicted by the ICC will be accused of crimes of a comparable
gravity, and the notion that proceedings against them might be dismissed because of procedural irregularities and ‘‘minor’’ human
rights abuses is also extremely unpalatable. It is easy to be sympathetic to the Appeals Chamber’s view that it is worthwhile to balance
the justice to be served by prosecuting against the relative seriousness
of the illegality that is alleged by the fugitive, which may or may not
involve sovereignty violations and could amount to procedural
mistreatment of the more innocuous variety. Adopting a blanket
mala captus, mala detentus approach would be equally destructive of
the mission of international criminal justice, and this too is an option
that should not be entertained seriously.
Regardless of one’s feelings about the triumph of functionalism
over formalism, the best that can be hoped for on this nearlyintractable issue is an exercise in flexible balancing, driven equally by
the interests of criminal justice, international security and international human rights norms. As the ICTY itself has offered, there
should be some connection between the egregiousness of the
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circumstances and the nature and extent of the remedy.161 I offer the
following suggestions as the skeleton of a solution:
1) The Appeal Chambers’ suggestion in Nikolic´ that a reviewing
court should not attribute any significance to international law
violations stemming from abduction must be rejected. The
legality of this holding is questionable even before that body, but
it is entirely inappropriate for the lateral system in which the ICC
exists. The ICC must engage with, and must be seen to engage
with, the issues of abduction, illegal rendition and illegal arrest,
and in a manner which makes the Court’s jurisdiction ratione
personae a live issue; unlike the UN tribunals, it does not have
the freedom not to.
2) The Court (most likely in a Pre-Trial Chamber) should engage in
a multi-factored balancing test:
i Step 1: examine any alleged inter-state international law violations, e.g. actual abduction (including by way of state-employed
bounty hunters), disguised extradition in violation of treaties
(including the Refugee Convention162), unlawful high seas apprehension, etc. The Court should adopt an approach which expressly
acknowledges the unique circumstances of the lateral system, as
well as both the Court’s and the international community’s policy
interests in deterring illegal state conduct;
ii Step 2: examine any alleged human rights violations, using the
procedural provisions of the Rome Statute and customary international human rights law as the baseline standard. In a Nikolic´type situation where the fugitive was ‘‘apprehended’’ by persons
unknown who have no provable connection to state forces, the
acts of these persons should be treated as those of state authorities, in order to dispense with any argument as to whether the
accused enjoys human rights vis-à-vis private actors;163
iii Step 3: review and acknowledge the crimes for which the accused
was indicted by the Court, including a specific account of what
the Prosecution intends to prove on each separate count (but
bearing in mind the presumption of innocence imposed by
Article 66 of the Rome Statute);
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iv Step 4: if the Court is satisfied that any of the allegations in either
of Steps (1) and (2) have been proven, then it should balance
these against the interests of the international community in
allowing prosecution to go forward. The Court should determine
both whether a remedy is justified in the circumstances, and if so
what form it should take.164 If the case is one of illegal arrest,
then the Article 85(1) procedure implemented by Chapter 10 of
the Rules of Evidence and Procedure can be undertaken and the
appropriate amount of compensation determined. The other
available remedies should be reduction in sentence (to be determined once/if sentence is imposed) or, in the most extreme cases,
dismissal. There should be a separate inquiry as regards
dismissal, along the lines of ‘‘would the administration of international justice be brought into disrepute if the case was dismissed?’’165 While a contextual inquiry should be undertaken as
regards both the state acts and human rights violations, proven
violation of jus cogens human rights norms (e.g. the prohibition
of torture) should make weight towards dismissal. For cases
which do not reach the high threshold for dismissal, some combination of compensation and reduction of sentence could be
imposed, the particulars to be formulated once the case is over.
3) The process outlined above should be adversarial, and the
Prosecutor should, in his/her discretion, make submissions in
support of the prosecution going forward in as unfettered a
manner as possible. The burden of proof should be on the
accused both to prove violations and to demonstrate why a
particular remedy is appropriate in the circumstances;
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4) The Assembly of States Parties should enact some form of
formalized mechanism to address abduction or other illegality,
perhaps by way of amending the Rome Statute to add some
kind of complaints-resolution mechanism or at least a subforum in which these issues could be discussed, and to which
non-state parties could bring complaints. While it is difficult to
imagine the state parties adopting anything beyond a fairly
toothless kind of ‘‘talk shop,’’ this forum could nonetheless act
as a sort of pressure valve, allowing states to engage each
other on the issues without having recourse to other measures,
e.g. claims before the ICJ.
The above are made as simply modest proposals for a principled
manner in which to deal with an extremely difficult issue. They may
provide a starting point for engagement and discussion, but it is clear
that engagement and discussion must occur if potentially intense and
destructive situations are to be avoided. Should the time come when
the ICC is more universally adhered to and a full or nearly full
universal jurisdiction is effectively in place for its subject matter, the
test could be adapted to these changing circumstances.
There is, in fact, some good to be said of Nikolic´, particularly
that in (a) allowing the accused to plead international law violations, and (b) allowing for the possibility of a remedy in the face
of extreme human rights abuses, it almost in passing elevated
human rights norms beyond issues of state sovereignty in terms of
their relative importance. This is consistent with the trend towards
making the individual truly the subject, rather than the object, of
international law and should be applauded. If Nikolic´ can be read
as the Appeal Chamber’s retreat from full engagement with the
abduction issue, the practically-minded will concede that the
decision was in some ways the most expeditious manner to get to a
resolution that would work for the unique context in which the
Tribunal operates.
The ICC, however, as noted earlier, does not have this luxury. It
must deal with abduction and illegal rendition in a way that ultimately accommodates, if it does not resolve, the seemingly impossible
dilemma—how many eggs to break to make the omelette; how far to
relax procedural human rights standards in order to ensure prosecution of the worst transgressors.
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V ADDENDUM
On 14 December 2006, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC rendered its
decision in an application by Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for the Court to
dismiss his case.166 The decision came to the author’s attention too
late for consideration of it to be incorporated into the text above, but
a few preliminary observations can be offered.
Before a Pre-Trial Chamber, Lubanga challenged the Court’s
ability to exercise jurisdiction over him under Article 19(2) of the
Rome Statute. Similarly to Barayagwiza, he alleged that he had been
mistreated while incarcerated in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo prior to his surrender to the Court, and further that the
Prosecutor had been complicit in this mistreatment. He applied for
dismissal and release on the basis of the abuse of process doctrine.
The Pre-Trial Chamber found that it could grant such a remedy for
abuse of process and on the protection of the fundamental rights of
the accused in Article 21(3), drawing support from both Nikolic´ and
Barayagwiza, but dismissed the application for lack of evidence.
While upholding the result reached by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the
Appeals Chamber took a significantly different legal approach that
stemmed from a restrictive interpretation of the Rome Statute. It
found that the question was not one of ‘‘jurisdiction’’ within the
meaning of Article 19 but was rather a sui generis motion, ‘‘a procedural step not envisaged by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or
the Regulations of the Court invoking a power possessed by the
Court to remedy breaches of the process in the interests of justice’’.167
It then reviewed the doctrine of abuse of process and found that,
because the concept is not really known to civilian systems, the
doctrine ‘‘is not generally recognised as an indispensable power of a
court of law, an inseverable attribute of judicial power,’’ and as such
was not among any inherent powers the Court may have.168 The
Court held, however, that the imposition of international human
rights standards in Article 21(3) gave the Court the power to stay

166

Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Judgment on the
Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2) of the Statute of 3
October 2006, 14 December 2006.
167
Ibid., para. 24.
168
Ibid., para. 35.

ABDUCTED FUGITIVES

&

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

393

proceedings if the treatment of the accused interferes with, ‘‘first and
foremost, in the context of the Statute, the right to a fair trial’’.169
This decision partly confirms some of the observations made
above.170 In particular the Court agrees that a human rights-based
remedy must be available to the accused under Article 21(3) of the
Rome Statute, though based on its treaty interpretation it appears to
refuse to characterize this as a ‘‘jurisdictional’’ power. The mala
captus bene detentus approach has been declined to this extent.
However, in rejecting the use of the abuse of process doctrine the
Appeals Chamber has taken a distinctly different tack on its powers
than that taken by the ICTY and ICTR. On the whole, by way of a
strict interpretation of its powers regarding jurisdiction and process,
the Court may have painted itself into a corner on the abduction
issue. If it has no access to abuse of process powers, then the justiciability of sovereignty violations in the apprehension of an accused
(as opposed to human rights violations) is in doubt. Yet, as argued
above, a failure by the Court to deal with this issue when presented is
likely to wreak havoc.
A possible solution is to treat the sovereignty violation as a human
rights issue. If an individual is abducted in state A by officials/agents
of state B, then the arresting parties are acting illegally under the laws
of state A and the apprehension itself amounts to, in human rights
terms, an arbitrary detention or illegal deprivation of liberty. This is a
workable solution that nonetheless leaves the inter-state conflict
outside the Court’s purview, and will only cover some situations.
Alternatively, perhaps the answer lies in the inherent powers of the
Court to which the Appeals Chamber briefly averred, but this is
currently far from clear.
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